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Abstract
Robustness issues arise in a variety of forms and are studied through multiple lenses
in the machine learning literature. Neural networks lack adversarial robustness
– they are vulnerable to adversarial examples that through small perturbations to
inputs cause incorrect predictions. Further, trust is undermined when models give
miscalibrated or unstable uncertainty estimates, i.e. the predicted probability is not
a good indicator of how much we should trust our model and could vary greatly
over multiple independent runs. In this paper, we study the connection between
adversarial robustness, predictive uncertainty (calibration) and model uncertainty
(stability) on multiple classification networks and datasets. We find that the inputs
for which the model is sensitive to small perturbations (are easily attacked) are
more likely to have poorly calibrated and unstable predictions. Based on this
insight, we examine if calibration and stability can be improved by addressing
those adversarially unrobust inputs. To this end, we propose Adversarial Robustness
based Adaptive Label Smoothing (AR-AdaLS) that integrates the correlations of
adversarial robustness and uncertainty into training by adaptively softening labels
conditioned on how easily it can be attacked by adversarial examples. We find
that our method, taking the adversarial robustness of the in-distribution data into
consideration, leads to better calibration and stability over the model even under
distributional shifts. In addition, AR-AdaLS can also be applied to an ensemble
model to achieve the best calibration performance.
1 Introduction
The robustness of machine learning algorithms is becoming increasingly important as ML systems
are being used in higher-stakes applications. However, “robustness” is often used informally and
has been widely studied from varied perspectives in the machine learning literature. In one line
of research, neural networks are shown to lack adversarial robustness – small perturbations to the
input can successfully fool classifiers into making incorrect predictions [31, 7, 4, 19, 24]. In largely
separate lines of work, researchers have studied uncertainty in model’s predictions. For example,
models are often miscalibrated where the predicted confidence is not indicative of the true likelihood
of the model being correct [8, 32, 16, 33, 15]. Further, these uncertainty estimates are often unstable,
with independent training runs resulting in significant differences in the predictions [26, 18, 22, 38].
Both of these uncertainty issues are exacerbated when models are asked to make predictions on data
different from the training distribution [27], which becomes an issue in practical settings where it is
important that we can trust model predictions even under distributional shift. Taken together, we see
a significant challenge for trusting model predictions – models often misrepresent confidence in their
predictions and are overly sensitive to spurious changes in input, training, or distribution.
Despite robustness, in all its forms, being a popular area of research, the relationship among these
perspectives has not been extensively explored previously. In this paper, we study the correlation
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between adversarial robustness and calibration as well as model’s stability. We discover that input
data that are sensitive to small adversarial perturbations (are easily attacked) are more likely to have
poorly calibrated and unstable predictions. This holds true on a number of network architectures for
classification and on all the datasets that we consider: SVHN [21], CIFAR-10 [14], CIFAR-100 [14]
and ImageNet [25]. This suggests that the miscalibrated and unstable uncertainty estimates on those
adversarially unrobust data greatly degrades the performance of a model’s calibration and stability.
Based on this insight, we hypothesize and study if calibration and stability, particularly on unknown
shifted data, can be improved by giving different supervision to the model depending on adversarial
robustness of each training data.
To this end, we propose Adversarial Robustness based Adaptive Label Smoothing (AR-AdaLS)
that integrates the correlations of adversarial robustness and uncertainty into training by adaptively
smoothing the training labels conditioned on how unrobust an input is. Our method improves label
smoothing [31] by explicitly teaching the model to differentiate the training data according to their
adversarial robustness and then adaptively smooth their labels. By giving different supervision to the
training data, our method leads to better calibration and stability over the model without an increase
of latency during inference. In particular, since adversarially unrobust data can be considered as an
outlier of the underlying data distribution [2], our method, by taking the adversarial robustness of the
in-distribution data into consideration during training, can even greatly improve model’s calibration
and stability on held-out shifted data, whose distribution is different from the training distribution.
Lastly, we propose “AR-AdaLS of Ensemble” to combine our AR-AdaLS and deep ensembles [16],
which is the state-of-the-art method especially under distributional shift [27], to further improve the
calibration performance for shifted data.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• Relationship among Robustness Metrics: By exploring three metrics for adversarial robust-
ness, predictive uncertainty (calibration) and model uncertainty (stability), we find a significant
correlation between adversarial robustness and uncertainty estimates: inputs that are unrobust to
adversarial attacks are more likely to have poorly calibrated and unstable predictions.
• Algorithm: We hypothesize that training a model with different supervision based on adversarial
robustness of each input will make the model better calibrated and more stable. To this end, we
propose AR-AdaLS to automatically learn how much to soften the labels of training data based
on their adersarial robustness. Further, we introduce “AR-AdaLS of Ensemble” to show how to
apply AR-AdaLS to an ensemble model.
• Experimental Analysis: On CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, we find that AR-AdaLS is more effective
than previous label smoothing methods in improving calibration and stability, particularly for
shifted data. Further, we find that while ensembling can be beneficial, applying AR-AdaLS to
adaptively calibrate ensembles offers further improvements to the model’s uncertainty estimates.
2 Related Work
Uncertainty Estimates How to better estimate a model’s predictive uncertainty is an important
research topic, since many models with a focus on accuracy may fall short in predictive uncertainty.
A popular way to improve a model’s predictive uncertainty is to make the model well-calibrated,
e.g., post-hoc calibration by temperature scaling [8], and multiclasss Dirichlet calibration [15]. In
addition, dropout-based variational inference [5, 13] can help DNN models make less over-confident
predictions and be better calibrated. Recently, mixup training [37] has been shown to improve both
models’ generalization and calibration [32], by preventing the model from being over-confident in its
predictions. Despite the success of improving uncertainty estimates over in-distribution data, [27]
argue that it does not usually translate to a better performance on data that shift from the training
distribution. Among all the methods evaluated by [27] under distributional shift, ensemble of deep
neural networks [16], is shown to be most robust to dataset shift, producing the best uncertainty
estimates, especially on the shifted data.
Adversarial Robustness On the other hand, machine learning models are known to be brittle [34]
and vulnerable to adversarial examples [1, 3, 4, 11]. Many defenses have been proposed to improve
model’s adversarial robustness [28, 35, 6], however are further attacked by more advanced defense-
aware attacks [4, 1]. Recently, [2, 29] defines adversarial robustness as the minimum distance in
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Table 1: Network architecture and accuracy used for each dataset.
Dataset SVHN CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 ImageNet
Network CNN-7 ResNet-29 v2 [10] Wide ResNet-28-10 v2 [36] ResNet-101 v1 [9]
Accuracy 95.0% 91.4% 79.4% 77.7%
the input domain required to change the model’s output prediction by constructing an adversarial
attack. The most recent work that is close to ours, [2], makes the interesting observation that easily
attackable training or testing examples are often outliers in the underlying data distribution and then
use adversarial robustness to determine an improved ordering for curriculum learning. Our work,
instead, explores the relationship between adversarial robustness and calibration as well as stability.
In addition, we use adversarial robustness as an indicator to adaptively smooth the training labels in
order to improve model’s calibration and stability.
Label Smoothing Label smoothing is originally proposed in [30] and is shown to be effective in
improving the quality of uncertainty estimates in [20, 32]. Instead of training a network by minimizing
the cross-entropy loss between the predicted probability pˆ and the one-hot label p, label smoothing
minimizes the cross-entropy between the predicted probability and a softened label p˜ = p(1− ) + Z ,
where Z is the number of classes in the dataset and  is a hyperparameter which controls the degree
of the smoothing effect. Our work makes label smoothing adaptive and incorporates adversarial
robustness to further improve calibration and stability.
3 Metrics for adversarial robustness and uncertainty
In this section, we introduce three metrics to measure different aspects of a model’s robustness. We
use arrows to indicate which direction is better.
Adversarial robustness ↑ Adversarial robustness measures the minimum distance in the input
domain required to change the model’s output prediction by constructing an adversarial attack [2, 29].
Specifically, given an input x and a classifier f(·) that predicts the class for the input, the adversarial
robustness is defined as the minimum adversarial perturbation δ that enables f(x + δ) 6= f(x).
Following the work [2], we construct the `2 based CW attack [4] and then use the `2 norm of the
adversarial perturbation ‖δ‖2 to measure the distance to the decision boundary. Therefore, a more
adversarially robust input requires a larger adversarial perturbation to change the model’s prediction.
Calibrationmetric ↓ Model’s calibration measures the alignment between the predicted probability
and the accuracy. Well calibrated uncertainty estimates convey the information about how much we
should trust a model’s prediction. We follow the widely used expected calibration error (ECE) to
measure the calibration performance of a network [8, 27]. To compute the ECE, we need to first divide
all the data into K buckets sorted by their predicted probability (confidence) of the predicted class.
Let Bk represent the set of data in the k-th confidence bucket. Then the accuracy and the confidence
of Bk are defined as acc(Bk) = 1|Bk|
∑
i∈Bk 1(yˆi = yi) and conf(Bk) =
1
|Bk|
∑
i∈Bk pˆ
yˆi
i , where yˆ
and y represent the predicted class and the true class respectively, and pˆyˆ is the predicted probability
of yˆ. The ECE is then defined as ECE =
∑K
k=1
|Bk|
N |acc(Bk)− conf(Bk)|, where N is the number
of the data. A better calibrated model should have a smaller ECE.
Model uncertainty metric ↓ Follow the work in [18, 22], we estimate the model uncertainty by
computing the variance of M independently trained models with random initializations. The variance
is computed as σ2 = 1M−1
1
N
∑M
m=1
∑N
i=1(pˆm,i − p¯i)2, where pˆm,i is the m-th model’s predicted
probability of the i-th data and p¯i = 1M
∑M
m=1 pˆm,i is the average predicted probability over M runs.
In addition, the variance can also be used to measure the model’s stability, where the most stable
model has the smallest variance.
4 Correlations between adversarial robustness and uncertainty estimates
Although these metrics of adversarial robustness and uncertainty estimates are conceptually related,
they are measuring quite different properties: As we can see that the adversarial robustness measures
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Figure 1: Correlations between adversarial robustness and uncertainty estimates on the clean test
set on SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet. Top: Accuracy and confidence score of the
predicted class. Bottom: ECE and variance score (lower is better)in each adversarial robustness
subset. The higher the adversarial robustness level is, the more adversarially robust (harder to attack)
the data are.
the property of the data by computing the adversarial perturbation δ from the input domain, while the
metrics for calibration and stability depend mainly on the model’s predicted probability in the output
space.
To test if there is any correlation between adversarial robustness and uncertainty estimates, we perform
experiments on the clean test set across four classification datasets: SVHN [21], CIFAR-10 [14],
CIFAR-100 [14] and ImageNet [25] with different networks, whose architecture and accuracy are
shown in Table 1. We refer to these models as “Vanilla” for each dataset in the following discussion.
Note that there are 10 classes for SVHN and CIFAR-10, 100 classes for CIFAR-100 and 1000 classes
for ImageNet. The details for training each vanilla network are included in Section A in the Appendix.
4.1 Adversarial robustness and calibration
To explore the relationship between adversarial robustness and calibration, we start with the relation-
ship between adversarial robustness and confidence together with accuracy. Specifically, we rank the
input data according to their adversarial robustness and then divide the dataset into R equally-sized
subsets (R = 10 used in this paper). For each adversarial robustness subset, we compute the accuracy
and the average confidence score of the predicted class. As shown in the first row in Figure 1, we
can clearly see that both accuracy and confidence increase as adversarial robustness of the input
data, and confidence is consistently higher than accuracy in each adversarial robustness subset across
four datasets. This indicates that although vanilla classification models achieve the state-of-the-art
accuracy, they tend to give over-confident predictions, especially for those unrobust data.
Based on this, to explore the relationship between adversarial robustness and calibration, we compute
the expected calibration error (ECE) in each adversarial robustness subset, shown in the bottom row
of Figure 1. In general, we find that those unrobust data in lower adversarial robustness levels are
more likely to be over-confident and less well calibrated (larger ECE). For more robust examples,
there is a better alignment between their confidence and accuracy, and the ECE over those examples
is close to 0. On larger-scale ImageNet, while we still see the general trend that less robust examples
are less well calibrated, we see that the least robust examples are relatively well calibrated. We
hypothesize this may be due to larger data and less overfitting.
4.2 Adversarial robustness and stability
Furthermore, we also find a strong correlation between adversarial robustness and model stability
across multiple independent runs. As shown in the bottom row of Figure 1, we see that those
adversarially unrobust examples tend to have a much higher variance compared to the robust across
all four datasets. The strong alignment between the adversarial robustness of the input data and the
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stability of their predictions suggests that in order to improve a model’s overall stability, one should
target to reduce the variance of those unrobust, easily attacked data.
Both of these results are surprising as they are connecting very different concepts. In particular,
adversarial robustness is measured over the input domain while both calibration and stability are
measured over the output space. Given the strong empirical connection, we now ask: can we improve
model calibration and stability by targeting adversarially unrobust examples?
5 Adversarial robustness based adaptive label smoothing
Based on the correlation between adversarial robustness and uncertainty estimates, we hypothesize
and study if calibration and stability can be improved by giving different supervision to the model
depending on the adversarial robustness of each training data. To this end, we propose a method
named Adversarial Robustness based Adaptive Label Smoothing (AR-AdaLS), which adapts label
smoothing conditional on adversarial robustness.
5.1 Adversarial robustness based label smoothing
Inspired by the correlations between adversarial robustness and uncertainty estimates discussed
in Section 4, we perform label smoothing at different degrees to the training data based on their
adversarial robustness. Specifically, we sort and divide the training data into R small subsets with
equal size according to their adversarial robustness1 and then use r to soften the labels in each
training subset Strainr . The soft labels can be formulated as:
p˜r = pr(1− r) + r
Z
, (1)
where pz=yr = 1 for the correct class y and p
z 6=y
r = 0 for the others, pr stands for the one-hot label,
and Z is the number of classes in the dataset. The parameter r controls the degree of smoothing
effect and allows for different levels of smoothing in each adversarial robustness subset. Generally, a
relatively larger r is desirable for lower adversarial robustness levels such that the model learns to
make a lower confidence prediction. Instead of empirically setting the parameter r in each adversarial
robustness subset, we allow it to be adaptively updated according to the calibration performance on
the validation set (discussed in Section 5.2). In this way, we explicitly train a network with different
supervision based on the adversarial robustness of training data.
There are two options to obtain the adversarial robustness. One is “on the fly”: to keep creating
the adversarial attacks during training, which provides precise adversarial robustness ranking but
at the cost of great computing time. The other is to “pre-compute” the adversarial robustness by
attacking a vanilla model with the same network architecture but trained with the hard labels. This
is more efficient but at the sacrifice of the precision of adversarial robustness ranking. In practice,
we find that it is sufficient to make the network differentiate the robust and unrobust data with the
pre-computed adversarial robustness. Therefore, we use the pre-computed adversarial robustness for
our experiments.
5.2 Adaptive learning mechanism
To find the best hyperparameter  for label smoothing, previous methods [30, 32] sweep  in a range
and choose the one that has the best validation performance. However, in our setting, the number of
combinations of r increases exponentially with the number of adversarial robustness subsets R. To
this end, we propose an adaptive learning mechanism to automatically learn the parameter r in each
adversarial robustness subset. The overall training procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
First, we denote the soft label for the correct class in the r-th adversarial robustness subset as p˜z=yr .
According to Eqn. (1), we can derive:
p˜z=yr = 1− r +
r
Z
. (2)
Since well-calibrated uncertainty estimates should be aligned with the empirical accuracy, we use the
calibration performance in the validation set to help update p˜z=yr for the training data. Specifically,
1Note, this method could be easily adapted to conditioning on other attributes of data.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of the training procedure for AR-AdaLS
Input: number of classes Z, number of training epochs T , number of adversarial robustness subset
R, learning rate of adaptive label smoothing α.
For each adversarial robustness training subset, we initialize the soft label as the one-hot label
p˜r,t = pr, and initialize the soft label for the correct class p˜
z=y
r,t = 1.
for t = 1 to T do
Minimize cross-entropy loss between soft label and predicted probability 1R
∑R
r L(p˜r,t, pˆr,t)
for r = 1 to R do
Update p˜z=yr,t ← p˜z=yr,t − α · {conf(Svalr )t − acc(Svalr )t} . according to Eqn. (3)
Clip p˜z=yr,t to be within (
1
Z , 1]
Update r,t ← (p˜z=yr,t − 1) · Z1−Z . according to Eqn. (4)
Update p˜r,t ← pr(1− r,t) + r,tZ . according to Eqn. (1)
end for
end for
we first rank the adversarial robustness of the validation data and split the validation set into R
equally-sized subsets. Then, we use the difference between confidence and accuracy in the r-th
adversarial robustness validation subset conf(Svalr )−acc(Svalr ) to update the soft label for the correct
class of training data in the r-th adversarial robustness training subset Strainr ,
p˜z=yr,t+1 = p˜
z=y
r,t − α · {conf(Svalr )t − acc(Svalr )t} (3)
where p˜z=yr,t is the soft label of the correct class in the r-th adversarial robustness training subset at time
step t. The accuracy and the confidence of Svalr are defined as acc(S
val
r ) =
1
|Svalr |
∑
i∈Svalr 1(yˆi = yi)
and conf(Svalr ) =
1
|Svalr |
∑
i∈Svalr pˆ
z=yˆi
i , where yˆ and y is the predicted class and the true class
respectively, pˆz=yˆ denotes the the predicted probability of the predicted class. The hyperparameter
α > 0 plays a role as a learning rate to update the soft label p˜z=yr,t based on the difference between
the predicted confidence and accuracy in the valiadation set. Intuitively, if we assign a large p˜z=yr to
training data, then the network tends to make a high confidence prediction and vice versa. Therefore,
if the confidence is greater than the accuracy (conf(Svalr ) > acc(S
val
r ))) in the validation set, we
should reduce p˜z=yr to teach the network to be less confident. Otherwise, we should increase p˜
z=y
r .
In addition, we also need to constrain p˜z=yr to be within (
1
Z , 1] after each update as it stands for the
true probability of the correct class, where Z is the number of classes in the dataset.
For a given p˜z=yr , we can easily obtain r by reversing Eqn. (2):
r = (p˜
z=y
r − 1) ·
Z
1− Z , (4)
and the soft labels for all the classes p˜r can be computed according to Eqn. (1). We update the soft
labels after each training epoch in our experiments.
Note that this adaptive learning mechanism can be easily applied to standard label smoothing without
adversarial robustness slicing (R = 1). In this case, we can replace sweeping the hyperparameter 
with this adaptive learning method, named as “Adaptive Label Smoothing” (AdaLS). Our proposed
AdaLS and AR-AdaLS does not increase the inference time: we test AdaLS and AR-AdaLS exactly
the same as a vanilla model.
6 Experiments
We now test our methods on both clean and shifted data for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet for calibration
and stability. The shifted dataset [12] consists of different types (19 types for CIFAR-10 and 15
types for ImageNet) of corruptions, e.g., noise, blur, weather and digital categories that are frequently
encountered in natural images. Each type of corruption has five levels of shift intensity, with
higher levels having more corruption. For each shift intensity, we report the results with a box
plot summarizing the 25th, 50th, 75th quartiles across the types of shift. We first test single-model
approaches and then explore how our methods compose with deep ensembles [16].
6
Figure 2: Comparison between LS and our AR-AdaLS on the clean test set of CIFAR-10. (a) and
(b): Accuracy and confidence score of the predicted class in each adversarial robustness subset. (c)
and (d): ECE and variance score of Vanilla, LS and AR-AdaLS.
6.1 Baselines
We compare our proposed AR-AdaLS with the following methods:
• Vanilla: We train a ResNet29-v2 [10] for CIFAR-10 and a ResNet101-v1 [9] for ImageNet with
regular training mechanism that one-hot labels are used for cross-entropy loss.
• Ensemble of Vanilla [16]: Ensemble of M vanilla models independently trained with random
initialization (M = 5 in our experiments). Deep ensembles are shown to be the best method for
model’s calibration, especially under distributional shift [27].
• Label Smoothing (LS) [30]: smooth the hard labels to soft labels and sweep the hyperparameter 
which controls the smoothing degree in a range to find the best hyperparameter .
• Adaptive Label Smoothing (AdaLS): we use our proposed adaptive learning mechanism introduced
in Section 5.2 to automatically learn the hyperparameter  rather than sweeping to find the best .
We train all the methods with the same network architectures and keep all the training hyperparameters
to be the same: e.g., learning rate, batch size, number of training epochs, for fair comparison. Please
refer to Appendix for all the training details and hyperparameters.
6.2 Visualization of improvement over uncertainty estimates
Since our proposed AR-AdaLS is built upon label smoothing (LS), in Figure 2 we visualize the effect
of label smoothing (LS) and our AR-AdaLS. Comparing Figure 2 (a) and (b), we can clearly see that
AR-AdaLS is better at calibrating the data than label smoothing, especially on the unrobust examples
(lower adversarial robustness level). Further, we show plots of ECE and variance in Figure 2 (c) and
(d). Both label smoothing and AR-adaLS improve model’s calibration and uncertainty over vanilla
model and AR-AdaLS has the best performance among three methods. This suggests that AR-AdaLS
is better at improving calibration and stability in unrobust regions, not just on average.
Figure 3 summarizes the ECE and variance for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet for both clean and shifted
data with different levels of corruptions [12]. Since ensembles are used to compute the variance (as
discussed in Section 3), we only report the variance of single-model based methods. On the clean
test set, all non-vanilla methods achieve comparable low values of ECE, and AR-AdaLS has the best
performance in improving model’s stability by having the smallest variance.
Generalization over shifted dataset When the intensity of shift increases, AR-AdaLS significantly
outperforms other single-model based methods with the lowest ECE and variance. Contrasting with
LS and AdaLS, we see AR-AdaLS benefits greatly from the adversarial robustness slicing. As a result,
our model learns to give smaller soft labels of the correct class to those adversarially unrobust training
data, which can also be considered as outliers of the underlying data distribution [2]. Therefore,
when tested on the shifted data that deep networks have been shown to produce pathologically
over-confident predictions [12], our model correctly learns to make a relatively lower confidence
prediction, resulting in a better calibration performance. When we compare to an ensemble of
five Vanilla models, we can see that AR-AdaLS achieves comparable calibration performance on
CIFAR-10 and the ensemble is better under highly shifted data on ImageNet.
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Figure 3: ECE and variance on clean test and shifted data on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. For each
shift intensity, we show the results with a box plot summarizing the 25th, 50th, 75th quartiles across
19 shift types on CIFAR10-C and 15 shift types on ImageNet-C. The error bars indicate the min
and max value across different shift types. Accuracy figures are shown in Appendix that all the
single-model based methods have comparable accuracy while ensembles achieve higher accuracy.
6.3 Combination with deep ensembles
In this section, we discuss if the two best models: deep ensembles and our AR-AdaLS are compli-
mentary to each other. To this end, we propose the following two ways to combine them:
Ensemble of AR-AdaLS: As in [16, 17], we ensemble AR-AdaLS by training multiple indepen-
dent AR-AdaLS models with random initialization, and average their predictions at inference.
AR-AdaLS of Ensemble: Instead of computing soft labels independently for each AR-AdaLS
model, we perform AR-AdaLS on the ensembled predictions, i.e., in Eqn. (3) we compute confidence
and accuracy based on the average of the M model predictions. Each model is then supervised with
the same soft labels. We will see this slight distinction in training is quite important.
Discussion We present the results for CIFAR-10 in Figure 4. At a high level, we see that AR-AdaLS
of Ensemble performs the best across both clean test data and all intensities of shifted data (numerical
results are provided in Table 3 in Appendix). Looking more closely, some trends emerge: all of the
ensemble methods perform relatively well for highly shifted data (intensity 4–5), but Ensemble of
AR-AdaLS performs much worse on less shifted and clean test data. Digging deeper we display
the confidence of the predicted class and accuracy of each single model and the corresponding
ensemble models on the clean test set of CIFAR-10 and ImageNet in Figure 5. We can clearly see
that the ensemble models generally increase accuracy and decrease confidence compared to a single
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Figure 4: Comparison of ensembled models: ECE on both clean test data and shifted data on CIFAR-
10 dataset. For each intensity of shift, we show the results with a box plot summarizing the 25th, 50th,
75th quartiles across 19 types of shift in CIFAR10-C dataset. The error bars indicate the min and
max value across different shift types. The accuracy figure is shown in Appendix. All the ensemble
models have a relatively higher accuracy than single-model based methods.
Figure 5: Comparing accuracy and confidence of the predicted class between single model and the
corresponding ensemble model for each method.
Figure 6: Reliability diagram of accuracy versus confidence of single model and ensemble model on
the clean test of CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. The perfect calibrated model should be aligned with the
diagonal dotted line (above is under-confident, below is over-confident).
model, which results from the disagreement of the prediction of each single model in ensembles.
Therefore, naive deep ensembles can improve calibration on highly shifted data where single-model
is over-confident but can harm calibration if applied to a well-calibrated single-model. This is made
clearer in Figure 6: while deep ensembles make over-confident vanilla model well calibrate, it leads
the well calibrated AR-AdaLS models to be under-confident (similar patterns observed on LS and
AdaLS, shown in Figure 8 in Appendix). From this perspective, AR-AdaLS of Ensemble avoids this
issue by adaptively adjusting smoothing to keep the ensemble well calibrated. Taken together we see
that AR-AdaLS improves calibration and stability for both single-models and ensembles.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the correlations between adversarial robustness and calibration as
well as stability. We find across multiple datasets that adversarially unrobust (easily attacked) data
are more likely to have poorly calibrated and unstable predictions. Based on this insight, we propose
AR-AdaLS to adaptively smooth the labels of the training data based on their adversarial robustness.
In our experiments we see that AR-AdaLS is more effective than previous label smoothing methods in
improving calibration and stability, particularly for shifted data, and can offer improvements on top of
already strong ensembling methods. We believe this is an exciting new use for adversarial robustness
as a means to more generally improve model trustworthiness, not just by limiting adversarial attacks
but also improving uncertainty on unexpected data. We hope this spurs further work at the intersections
of these areas of research.
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Broader Impact
The robustness of model accuracy and uncertainty estimates, to both clean and out-of-distribution
data, is increasingly understood to be critical to trusting machine learning in high-stakes applications.
For example, for determining if a person is diagnosed with a certain disease based on medical imaging,
in addition to model’s high accuracy overall, the model should also give responsible uncertainty
estimates in terms of not being over-confident under cases where it should not be (e.g., people
with special health conditions might have out-of-distribution imaging results). For auto-driving
applications it is also important for the model to give low uncertainty estimates over unseen data,
which could save lives.
This work aims to utilize adversarial robustness to improve uncertainty estimates in ML models.
We believe improving these metrics are beneficial to the applications above. While our method by
no means fully solves these concerns, we hope this research both raise people’s awareness of the
importance of these metrics and encourages further improvements to the trustworthiness of real-world
ML models.
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A Implementation Details
A.1 SVHN
We use a simple network architecture with 7 convolutional layers and follow all the training details
introduced in [23] for SVHN. This network architecture achieves the state-of-the-art accuracy on
SVHN.
A.2 CIFAR-10
All the experimental results on CIFAR-10 were obtained with a ResNet-29 v2 [10] with a batch size
of 256. The network is trained with Adam optimizer [13] for 200 epochs. The initial learning rate
is 10−3 and decayed down to 10−4 after 80 epochs, 10−5 after 120 epochs, 10−6 after 160 epochs
and 0.5× 10−6 after 180 epochs. We adapted the following data augmentation and training script
at https://keras.io/examples/cifar10_resnet/. The training mechanism is the same for all
the methods that we compare in the main paper. We randomly split the training dataset into training
data of 45000 images and 5000 images as the validation set. The test set has 10000 images.
For label smoothing (LS), we sweep the hyperparameter  within the range [0, 0.1] with a step
size 0.01 and find that the network has the best calibration performance on the validation set when
 = 0.02.
For Adaptive Label Smoothing (AdaLS), there is a hyperparameter α which plays a role as learning
rate in the adaptive learning mechanism. We choose hyperparameter α based on the calibration
performance on the validation set. Specifically, we run experiments with α ∈ {0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1}
and find that α = 0.05 achieve the best calibration performance.
Similarly, for Adversarial Robustness based Adaptive Label Smoothing (AR-AdaLS), we choose the
hyperparameter α from the set {0.005, 0.01, 0.05} and empirically set α = 0.005 which has the best
calibration performance on the validation set. We use the same hyperparameter α = 0.005 without
further tuning for AR-AdaLS of Ensemble.
All the results of ensemble models are obtained via training 5 independent models with random
initializations.
A.3 CIFAR-100
We train a Wide ResNet-28-10 v2 [36] to obtain the state-of-the-art accuracy for CIFAR-100. We
adapt the same training details and data augmentation at https://github.com/google/edward2/
blob/master/baselines/cifar/deterministic.py.
A.4 ImageNet
All the experiments on ImageNet were obtained via training a ResNet-101 v1 [9] following the train-
ing script at https://github.com/google/edward2/blob/master/baselines/imagenet/
deterministic.py. The network is trained with a batch size of 128 for each TPU core with
SGD optimizer for 90 epochs. The input image is normalized (divided by 255) to be within [0,1].
We randomly divide 50000 validation images into validation set with 25000 images and test set with
25000 images. Note that the same dataset and training mechanisms are used for all the methods that
we compare in the main paper.
For Label Smoothing (LS), we sweep the hyperparameter  within the range [0, 0.1] with a step
size 0.01 and find that the best calibration performance on the validation set is achieved by setting
 = 0.02.
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For Adaptive Label Smoothing (AdaLS), we sweep the hyperparameter α in the set
{0.005, 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.1} and set it to be α = 0.03 for the best calibration performance on
the validation set.
We empirically set α = 0.001 for AR-AdaLS in the first 60 epochs of the training and then increase
it to 0.05 for the next 30 epochs. The same hyperparameter α is used for AR-AdaLS of Ensemble
without further tuning.
All the ensemble models are a combination of 5 independent models with random initializations.
A.5 CW attacks
To compute the adversarial robustness, we construct `2 based CW attacks [4] follow-
ing the code at https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/blob/master/cleverhans/
attacks/carlini_wagner_l2.py. Specifically, we set the binary search steps to be 3, max itera-
tions to be 500 and learning rate to be 0.005. The generated untargeted CW attacks can achieve 100%
success rate for all the datasets that we consider: SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet.
We set the number of adversarial robustness training subset and validation subset to be R = 10
respectively.
Figure 7: Comparison of ensembled models: ECE and Accuracy on both clean test data and shifted
data on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. For each intensity of shift, we show the results with a box plot
summarizing the 25th, 50th, 75th quartiles across 19 types of shift on CIFAR-10-C and 15 types of
shift on ImageNet-C. The error bars indicate the min and max value across different shift types.
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Figure 8: Reliability diagram of accuracy versus confidence of single model and ensemble model on
the clean test of CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. The perfect calibrated model should be aligned with the
diagonal dotted line (above is under-confident, below is over-confident).
B Calibration Performance: Additional Results
In Figure 7, we show ECE and accuracy of all the single-models and their corresponding ensembles
on the clean test and shifted CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. The high-level conclusion is: 1) all the
ensemble models that we compare have similar accuracies, which are higher than single-models.
2) all the ensemble methods perform relatively well for highly shifted data but ensembles of well
calibrated models (Ensemble of LS, Ensemble of AdaLS, Ensemble of AR-AdaLS) perform much
worse on less shifted and clean test data. 3) AR-AdaLS of Ensemble successfully learns to adaptively
adjust its smoothing level to keep the ensemble well calibrated on both clean and shifted dataset.
Figure 8 is to validate the observation that naive ensembling of a single model can improve calibration
on highly shifted data where single-model is over-confident but can harm calibration on clean test
data where single model is well calibrated. As shown in Figure 8, we can see that if the single-model
is over-confident (Vanilla), Ensemble of Vanilla greatly improves the model’s calibration. However,
when the single model is well-calibrated (LS, AdaLS, AR-AdaLS), naive ensembling of these models
leads to an under-confident model with a worse calibration performance. In contrast, AR-AdaLS
of Ensemble successfully avoids this issue by adaptively smoothing the training labels according to
adversarial robustness of training data.
C Numerical Results
We report the mean of variance and mean of ECE across 19 types of shift for CIFAR-10-C and 15
types of shift for ImageNet-C in Table 2 and Table 3. We can see that AR-AdaLS achieves the best
performance in model’s calibration (the smallest ECE) and stability (the smallest variance) among all
the single-model based methods on the corrupted datasets. For the ensemble models, our proposed
AR-AdaLS of Ensemble also achieves the best calibration performance on the corrupted datasets.
Table 2: Mean of variance (×10−2) across 19 types of shift for CIFAR-10-C and 15 types of shift for
ImageNet-C. The best model is shown in bold.
Dataset CIFAR-10-C ImageNet-C
Shift Intensity 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Vanilla 7.85 9.69 11.2 13.1 16.0 5.28 6.39 7.37 8.23 8.29
LS 5.54 6.95 8.11 9.65 11.8 4.86 5.84 6.78 7.55 7.41
AdaLS 5.47 6.87 7.95 9.44 11.5 4.79 5.77 6.66 7.51 7.56
AR-AdaLS 4.21 5.06 5.73 6.66 8.24 4.53 5.49 6.12 6.76 6.66
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Table 3: Mean of ECE (×10−2) across 19 types of shift for CIFAR-10-C and 15 types of shift for
ImageNet-C. The best single model and ensemble model are shown in bold respectively.
Dataset CIFAR-10-C ImageNet-C
Shift Intensity 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Vanilla 9.59 12.9 15.6 19.5 25.7 4.67 6.94 9.60 13.2 16.6
LS 4.45 7.06 9.15 12.1 17.5 2.38 4.62 7.39 11.4 15.1
AdaLS 4.06 6.65 8.85 11.7 16.5 2.37 4.48 7.18 11.1 14.6
AR-AdaLS 2.57 4.09 5.64 7.85 11.9 2.44 3.58 5.80 9.33 12.9
Ensemble of Vanilla 2.47 4.13 5.73 8.03 12.1 2.77 2.51 2.87 4.64 8.26
Ensemble of LS 2.77 3.24 3.96 5.20 7.85 4.96 4.18 3.65 3.65 6.94
Ensemble of AdaLS 3.48 3.74 4.86 5.95 7.74 5.20 4.36 3.61 3.74 6.92
Ensemble of AR-AdaLS 4.23 4.52 5.23 5.68 7.68 5.76 5.23 4.51 3.69 6.33
AR-AdaLS of Ensemble 1.97 2.98 3.91 5.38 7.98 3.41 3.03 2.84 3.61 7.03
15
